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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past twenty-seven years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has interpreted the federal patent venue statute quite
liberally, with the result being that large companies accused of patent
infringement can be sued in virtually any federal district court.1 The U.S.
Supreme Court, which previously construed the very same venue statute

*
Chief Counsel of Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”), a nonprofit, public-interest
law firm located in Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein are his own. Mr. Samp
is a graduate of Harvard College and the University of Michigan Law School.
1
See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
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far more narrowly,2 has agreed to review the issue once again,3 and it will
render its decision by this June.
The issue of patent venue has received increased attention in recent
years, mostly due to the emergence of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas as the go-to district for patent holders seeking
a fast-moving and patent-friendly court.4 However, companies that do not
maintain a regular place of business in that largely rural section of Texas
question why it is appropriate that they can be hauled into the Eastern
District to answer on a nationwide basis for allegedly infringing activity.
On the other hand, some patent holders worry that if the Supreme Court
overturns the Federal Circuit, they may face increased difficulty in finding
a convenient forum for raising all of their claims against an alleged
infringer.
While the proper construction of the patent venue statute5 will be the
principal focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland LLC v.
Kraft Foods Group Brands, lurking in the background is the Court’s recent
increased interest in the enforcement of due process limits on courts’
exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.6 Allowing
a court in Marshall, Texas to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign (i.e., nonTexas) corporation based on allegedly infringing activity that occurred
outside the State raises as many personal-jurisdiction concerns as venue
concerns. The Court may well construe the patent venue statute narrowly
as a means of avoiding the difficult constitutional issues that would arise
if venue rules permitted companies that operate on a nationwide basis to
be sued in any federal district in which they sell their products.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the relevant federal statutes and
how they have been construed by the Federal Circuit. Part III outlines the
evolution of venue rules governing federal-court patent litigation over the
past 125 years, as well as the evolution of limits on personal jurisdiction
during that same period. Part IV explains why current rules—under which
a patentee may sue a defendant for all of its allegedly infringing activity
in any district in which any infringing sales occur—raise serious due
process concerns. This Article concludes with the acknowledgement that
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 614 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341).
4
In 2015, 44% of all patent infringement lawsuits filed nationwide were filed in the
Eastern District of Texas. Brian Howard, Lex Machina 2015 End-of-Year Trends (Jan. 7,
2016).
5
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
6
See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The Court has scheduled
oral argument on April 25, 2017 in two pending cases that raise important personal
jurisdiction issues: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, Case No. 16-466; and
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, Case No. 16-405.
2
3
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some patent owners may have legitimate concerns over the Fourco venue
rules’ potential for creating serious difficulties. These concerns should be
addressed to Congress, which has promised to revisit the issue regardless
how the Court rules in TC Heartland.

II. WHERE DOES A CORPORATION “RESIDE” FOR VENUE
PURPOSES?
In 1897, Congress first enacted a “special” patent venue statute only
applicable to patent-infringement litigation. The current version, adopted
in 1948, states in its entirety: “Any civil action for patent infringement
may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular
and established place of business.”7
TC Heartland boils down to a dispute over the meaning of the word
“resides,” as used in § 1400(b). In 1957, the Supreme Court held that a
corporation being sued for patent infringement “resides” solely in one
place: the State in which it is incorporated.8 In 1990, the Federal Circuit
ruled that the word “resides” should be read far more broadly; it concluded
that a corporation “resides,” for patent venue purposes, in any judicial
district in which it “is subject to personal jurisdiction.”9 The Federal
Circuit based its broadened reading of “resides” on Congress’s 1988
adoption of a technical amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), a subsection
within the general venue statute.10 The Federal Circuit concluded that
Congress intended to “redefine[ ] the meaning of the term ‘resides’ in
[§ 1400(b)].”11 It held that after 1988, § 1400(b) incorporated the revised
§ 1391(c)’s broad understanding of where a corporation should “be

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Patents are issued by the federal government, and litigation
regarding whether a patent is valid and infringed is heard exclusively in the federal courts.
Section 1400(b)’s reference to “judicial district” is a reference to the district in which a
federal district court is located.
8
Fourco, 353 U.S. at 226. As interpreted by Fourco, § 1400(b) authorized venue in a
judicial district: (1) in a corporate defendant’s State of incorporation; or (2) in which it
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.
9
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578, 1584.
10
The amendment slightly revised 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which after 1988 read as
follows: “For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall
be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at
the time the action is commenced.” Section 1391(c) was revised again in 2011 and
currently states: “Residency.—For all venue purposes— . . . (2) an entity with the capacity
to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, whether or not incorporated,
shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”
11
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578.
7
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deemed to reside”12—that is, a corporation “resides” wherever it “is
subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.”
Soon thereafter, the Federal Circuit addressed the question left open
by VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.13: in which judicial
districts is a corporate defendant “subject to personal jurisdiction?” The
Federal Circuit ruled in Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.14
that a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in a federal district in
any State in which its allegedly infringing product is sold. Moreover, it
concluded that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction with
respect to all allegedly infringing sales, not simply those sales that
occurred in the forum State.15 The appeals court determined that by
permitting a district court to exercise jurisdiction on a nationwide basis,
“these other states will thus be spared the burden of providing a forum for
[the plaintiff] for these sales. And defendants will be protected from
harassment resulting from multiple suits.”16
As a result of the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding and Beverly Hills Fan
decisions, corporate defendants that sell products on a nationwide basis
can be sued in federal district court anywhere in the United States. TC
Heartland, the defendant in the case at issue in this Article, sells no more
than 2% of its allegedly infringing product in Delaware and maintains no
established place of business there. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the Delaware federal district court’s decision to invoke the
Delaware long-arm statute to exercise personal jurisdiction over TC
Heartland with respect to all allegedly infringing activity—even the 98%
of such activity that bore no relationship to Delaware—was consistent
with constraints imposed on courts by the Due Process Clause.17

Id.
Id. at 1274.
14
Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The court imposed one caveat: personal jurisdiction was proper only if the forum State’s
long-arm statute also authorized courts to exercise jurisdiction over the corporation. Id. at
1569. But that caveat has little practical significance, given that the long-arm statutes of
virtually all States permit their courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign
defendants to the full extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
15
Id. at 1568.
16
Id.
17
In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1343-45 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
12
13
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III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT VENUE AND PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
A. Patent Litigation Through 1970
Congress adopted a “special” patent venue statute, the predecessor of
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), in 1897.18 This statute (referred to herein as § 48)
stated that venue for patent-infringement actions existed “in the district of
which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the
defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have
committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place
of business.”19 As the Supreme Court concluded in its 1942 decision in
Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., Congress adopted the statute in
order to “limit th[e] jurisdiction” of federal district courts over patentinfringement actions.20
The Court explained that Congress was
responding to “abuses engendered by extensive venue” authorized by
previous statutes governing federal courts; these statutes had permitted
actions (including patent-infringement actions) to be maintained
“wherever the defendant could be found.”21
A decade earlier, in 1887, Congress had adopted a statute that sought
to impose general limits on venue, but courts construing the statute
expressed uncertainty regarding whether those limitations applied to
patent-infringement suits.22 Thereafter, Congress adopted the Act of 1897,
which contained § 48, a provision solely focusing on venue in patent
litigation.23 Congress’s purpose in doing so was to “eliminate [that]
uncertainty” by “defin[ing] the exact jurisdiction of the federal courts in
actions to enforce patent rights.”24 The Stonite Court concluded that this
“purpose indicates that Congress did not intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail
with the general provisions relating to the venue in civil suits, but rather
that it alone should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.”25
Congress’s 1897 adoption of § 48 occurred in an era when the
authority of courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over those not living
in the forum State was more limited than it is today. In 1877, the Supreme
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff held that state courts could exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident only by effecting personal service of
See Act of March 3, 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 695.
In 1911, the patent venue statute was codified as Section 48 of the Judicial Code, 28
U.S.C. § 109 (1940).
20
Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565 n.1 (1942).
21
Id. at 563.
22
Id. at 564.
23
Id. at 565.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 565-66.
18
19
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process within the State; service in another State or by publication within
the State was insufficient.26 Accordingly, in the Nineteenth Century, it
was often very difficult to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant
outside its home State, even if the defendant conducted business in other
States.
However, the one exception permitted by Pennoyer—personal service
of process on a non-resident defendant while the defendant happened to
be located in the forum State—led to widespread confusion when the
defendant was a corporation. Courts had to grapple with the issue of when
a nonresident corporation should be deemed physically present in a State.
As the Supreme Court noted in Stonite, the issue was particularly difficult
in patent infringement litigation because many pre-1897 court decisions
interpreted federal venue statutes as permitting infringement suits to be
filed “wherever the defendant could be found,” and such an interpretation
led to “abuses.”27
Section 48, the “special” patent venue statute, eliminated this
confusion. In fact, it did so in a manner that was reasonably favorable to
plaintiffs when compared to other, contemporaneous venue provisions.
The statute authorized venue not only in the defendant’s home jurisdiction,
but also in any federal judicial district in which the alleged infringer “shall
have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established
place of business.”28 Venue in other types of actions was more limited;
for example, in diversity-jurisdiction cases, Congress prescribed that
venue was proper only in a judicial district in which either the plaintiff or
the defendant resided.29
The patent venue rules established in 1897 did not change throughout
most of the Twentieth Century. The Supreme Court affirmed those rules
in 1942 (Stonite) and 1957 (Fourco), rejecting efforts to liberalize venue
restrictions.30

B. Patent Litigation in Recent Decades
While patent venue rules remained the same, Twentieth Century legal
developments eventually led some scholars to conclude that those rules
were out-of-date. In particular, the Supreme Court in International Shoe
v. Washington overturned Pennoyer and held that a defendant’s physical
presence in the forum State was no longer a constitutional prerequisite to

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877).
Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563-65.
28
Sec. 48 of the Judicial Code of 1911, 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940).
29
Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, amended by Act of August 13, 1888, c.
866, 25 Stat. 433.
30
Stonite, 315 U.S. at 566; Fourco, 353 U.S. at 229.
26
27
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a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.31 The Court
held:
[D]ue process requires . . . that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.32
As a result of International Shoe, companies became subject to suit
wherever their products were sold, without any regard to whether they
regularly conducted business in the forum State. In light of the Court’s
decision, some scholars in the 1960s and 1970s began to question what
they viewed as overly restrictive patent venue rules. If a company could
be sued on state-law products-liability claims in any State to which the
allegedly defective product was shipped, then why could a company that
made infringing sales in all fifty States only be sued in its home State, or
a judicial district in which it maintains “a regular and established place of
business?”33 The patent venue rules seemed all the more anomalous to
those critics as lower federal courts began to view International Shoe as
having largely eliminated all due process constraints on the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over large, nationwide corporations, even when the
lawsuit bears no substantial relationship to the forum State.
The Federal Circuit in VE Holding appears to have arrived at its
decision based largely on its belief that patent venue rules were out-ofdate, and only secondarily on the thin evidence that Congress really
intended to change those rules when it amended the general venue statute
in 1988. The decision cited extensive criticism of restrictive patent rules,
including a claim that “[t]he continued existence of the patent venue
statute serves only to prolong patent litigation and make it more
expensive.”34 The court asserted that Congress adopted the 1988
amendments “in response to pressure from the bar and the courts,”35
thereby suggesting that Congress altered the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c) for the purpose of liberalizing patent venue rules. However, the
court provided no citations for that assertion. To the contrary, all available

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
33
See, e.g., Richard Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STANFORD
L. REV. 551 (1973).
34
VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1583.
35
Id. at 1578.
31
32
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evidence suggests that Congress viewed the altered language as a minor
technical amendment, not a substantial overhaul of patent venue rules.36
If VE Holding was the product of an era when limits on venue and
personal jurisdiction were skeptically viewed as unnecessary obstacles to
efficient and low-cost litigation, then this era appears to have come to an
end. Perhaps driven by increased concerns over unfairness to defendants
caused by excessive forum shopping, the Supreme Court in recent years
has demonstrated greater willingness to impose limits on personal
jurisdiction. This trend is best illustrated by the Court’s decision in
Daimler AG v. Bauman, which categorically rejected the widespread view
of many lower courts that large corporations are subject to general
personal jurisdiction in all 50 States.37 VE Holdings is in considerable
tension with Daimler and other recent personal jurisdiction case law.

IV. EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER TC HEARTLAND IN
DELAWARE RAISES SERIOUS DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
A. Due Process Limitations on Exercise of Jurisdiction over Outof-State Defendants
The Federal Circuit’s decision in TC Heartland interprets the federal
patent venue statute as permitting an out-of-state corporate defendant to
be hauled into federal court in a district (Delaware) where it arguably fails
to satisfy the “minimum contacts” required to sustain personal
jurisdiction.38 The ruling permits a Delaware court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over claims that TC Heartland infringed—on a nationwide
basis—three patents held by Kraft Foods, even though 98% of those
claims bear no relationship whatsoever to Delaware.39 Although TC
Heartland did not raise this due process issue in its certiorari petition, the
constitutional concerns raised by the case may provide the Supreme Court
with an additional ground to adopt TC Heartland’s interpretation of the
patent venue statute.
When considering the Delaware court’s personal jurisdiction over TC
Heartland, it is important to note that Kraft Foods (like most plaintiffs in
patent infringement litigation) asserts personal jurisdiction under state
law, not federal law. “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 66 (1988) (characterizing the amendment to
§ 1391(c) as one of a series of miscellaneous provisions dealing with relatively minor
discrete proposals).
37
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
38
In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
39
Id. at 1343-44.
36
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determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”40 The
Delaware court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims against
TC Heartland if, and only if, it is permitted to do so under the Delaware
long-arm statute.41
In appropriate circumstances, federal law may supplement state law in
authorizing a federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction.42
Furthermore, there is a federal statute43 that grants limited authorization
for federal district courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants charged
with patent infringement. However, Kraft has no plausible claim that the
Delaware federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction over TC
Heartland on the basis of the federal statute.44
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes strict
limits on the authority of a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants.45 Those limitations serve both to protect litigants
from inconvenient or distant litigation, and to recognize limits on the
sovereignty of each State with respect to affairs arising in other States.46
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a state court may not
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant simply
because the defendant has engaged in continuous and systematic activities
within the State. Rather, personal jurisdiction also requires a showing that
the defendant’s in-state activities are sufficiently connected to the
plaintiff’s claim.47 As Daimler explained, personal jurisdiction may not
be exercised over nonresident defendants based on claims “having nothing

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)).
Given the breadth of the Delaware long-arm statute, the personal-jurisdiction analysis
is essentially a due process analysis. Under that statute, Delaware state courts (and,
accordingly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware) may exercise personal
jurisdiction on virtually any basis not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. For example,
the statute authorizes state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident
who, inter alia, “Transacts any business or performs any character of work or services in
the State,” “Contracts to supply services or things in this State,” or “Causes tortious injury
in the State by an act or omission in this State.” 10 Del. C. § 3104(c).
42
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
43
28 U.S.C. § 1694.
44
Section 1694 provides that “a patent infringement action [may be] commenced in a
district where the defendant is not a resident but has a regular and established place of
business” and that service of process may be made upon the defendant’s “agent or agents
conducting such business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1694. But Kraft has never attempted to rely on that
jurisdictional provision, nor could it because TC Heartland does not have “a regular and
established place of business” in Delaware.
45
See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (plurality)
(“[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be
subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.”).
46
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
47
See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757.
40
41
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to do with anything that occurred or had its principal impact in” the forum
State.48
In addition, a defendant is generally required to answer any and all
claims asserted in its “home” jurisdiction, even if the claim bears no
relationship to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refers to an assertion
of personal jurisdiction where the defendant is “at home” as an exercise of
“general jurisdiction.”49 Daimler made plain, however, that an assertion
of general jurisdiction over a corporation can be sustained in only two
places: the State in which a corporation maintains its principal place of
business and the State of incorporation.50 In Daimler, the Court found the
plaintiffs’ request for approval of “the exercise of general jurisdiction in
every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous,
and systematic course of business,” to be “too grasping.”51 When a patent
infringement lawsuit is filed outside the defendant’s “home” jurisdiction,
a federal district court seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant with respect to each of the patent-infringement claims asserted
by the patentee must do so on the basis of “specific jurisdiction.”52

B. Most of Kraft’s Claims Are Unrelated to TC Heartland’s
Contacts with Delaware
It is undisputed that TC Heartland is not subject to general jurisdiction
in Delaware. It is not incorporated in Delaware, nor does it maintain its
principal place of business in the State. Therefore, for the Delaware
district court to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over TC Heartland
with respect to each of the patent infringement claims asserted by Kraft, it
must do so on the basis of “specific jurisdiction”—that is, a showing that
each claim “arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.”53
Importantly, only those forum contacts that are directly related to the
plaintiff’s claims are relevant to the due process determination.54 Kraft
can demonstrate the requisite minimum contacts with respect to its claims
that TC Heartland shipped infringing products to Delaware. While those
shipments were relatively small and amounted to less than 2% of TC
Heartland’s total sales of the infringing product, the Delaware shipments
Id. at 762.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
50
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
51
Id. at 760-61.
52
Id. at 754.
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (for a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, “the defendant’s suit-related conduct
must create a substantial connection with the forum State”) (emphasis added).
48
49
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establish a “substantial connection” between Delaware and the alleged
patent infringement. Those claims are adequate to allege that TC
Heartland “deliver[ed] its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they [would] be purchased by consumers in the forum
State.”55
However, the complaint is not limited to claims based on allegedly
infringing acts with a connection to Delaware. Kraft further alleges that
TC Heartland infringed its patents by manufacturing products in Indiana
and selling them in States other than Delaware.56 Those claims—which
encompass more than 98% of TC Heartland’s allegedly infringing sales—
bear no relationship to Delaware. Accordingly, specific jurisdiction
cannot serve as a justification for the district court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over those claims. Although TC Heartland does in fact have
some contacts with Delaware, these contacts cannot justify an expansive
exercise of specific jurisdiction because they bear no relationship to the
specific claims at issue—that TC Heartland infringed the patent by
manufacturing patented products and by selling them in States other than
Delaware.
In the field of patent law, courts have long understood that each
alleged infringement of a patent gives rise to a separate cause of action.57
While a claim that a defendant sold an infringing product in California
may raise one or more issues of fact that are common to issues of fact
raised by a claim that the defendant also sold an infringing product in
Delaware, they remain separate causes of action for which the plaintiff
will need to submit separate evidence. Specific jurisdiction is limited to
claims for which the defendant’s forum contacts “gave rise to the liabilities
sued on.”58 Because TC Heartland’s contacts with Delaware quite clearly
did not “g[i]ve rise to” the claims alleging that TC Heartland
manufactured and sold infringing products outside of Delaware, there is
no justification for the district court to exercise “specific jurisdiction” over
those out-of-state claims.
The Federal Circuit relied on its 1994 Beverly Hills Fan decision in
finding that TC Heartland’s small number of product shipments to
Delaware sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction over TC Heartland
with respect to infringement claims arising in the other forty-nine States
and lacking any connection with Delaware.59 However, that decision is a
relic of the pre-Daimler era, in which many federal courts of appeals
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
In re Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d at 1340.
57
See Hazelquist v. Guchi Moochie Tackle Co., Inc., 437 F.3d 1178, 1180 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
58
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754.
59
In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d at 1344.
55
56

56
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permitted large corporations to be sued in any State where they maintained
a substantial presence.
Beverly Hills Fan concluded that nationwide jurisdiction over patentinfringement claims (in any district in which alleged infringement
occurred) was warranted because it would “provid[e] a forum for
efficiently litigating plaintiff’s cause of action.”60 However, the Supreme
Court has never allowed efficiency considerations to trump due process
constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Those constraints
impose firm limits on the authority of courts to exercise jurisdiction over
claims and defendants that lack a sufficient connection to the forum:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the
tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its laws to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgment.61
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s decision overlooks the possibility that
there will always be some jurisdiction—perhaps multiple jurisdictions—
in which a patentee can sue an alleged infringer for all infringing activity
without regard to where it occurred. Daimler makes clear that a corporate
defendant will be subject to general jurisdiction in both its State of
incorporation, and the State in which it maintains its principal place of
business.62 Furthermore, Congress has established personal jurisdiction—
for patent-infringement claims arising anywhere in the United States—in
any district in which the defendant “is not a resident but has a regular and
established place of business.”63
The Federal Circuit has interpreted the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b), as authorizing the filing of a nationwide patent infringement
lawsuit in any judicial district in which infringing sales occurred (i.e.,
anywhere in the United States, when the corporate defendant sells its
products on a nationwide basis).64 However, even under the broadest
possible construction of the statute that (according to the Federal Circuit)
defines where a corporation “resides” for purposes of § 1400(b),65
residence (and thus, venue) extends only to judicial districts in which the
60
61
62
63
64
65

Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1568.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
28 U.S.C. § 1694.
In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d at 1343-45.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
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defendant “is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the
civil action in question.”66 Thus, the broad corporate-residence rules
created by the general venue statute can plausibly be interpreted to be
inapplicable to the patent venue statute for the additional reason that
applying them to § 1400(b) (in the manner prescribed by Beverly Hills
Fan) would arguably create venue in judicial districts in which the district
court would lack nationwide personal jurisdiction over the alleged
infringer.
The Supreme Court can avoid the due process concerns outlined above
by adopting the more limited interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) urged
by TC Heartland and accepted by Fourco. Under this interpretation, a
corporation “resides” only in the district in which it is incorporated. This
means that venue is appropriate in the district in which the alleged
infringer is incorporated, or in any district in which it has committed acts
of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.
Establishing venue in the district in which the defendant is incorporated is
consistent with the due process limits on general jurisdiction established
by Daimler. Furthermore, establishing venue in a district in which the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business, is both consistent with due process and
authorized by the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1694, governing the
distribution of cases within the unified federal court system.

C. Congress May Wish to Amend § 1400(b) to Promote Efficiency
In construing the meaning of § 1400(b), the Supreme Court has two
options. It can re-affirm Fourco’s narrow reading of patent venue rules,
or it can uphold the Federal Circuit’s far broader reading. For the reasons
outlined above, the Fourco reading is the preferred outcome, in large part
because it is the only outcome that does not raise serious constitutional
concerns.
This is not to suggest, however, that the patent venue rules established
by Fourco are fair and efficient under all circumstances. Some patent
owners may indeed have legitimate concerns that the Fourco rules could
create serious difficulties for plaintiffs seeking to defend their patent rights
in federal court. For that reason, Congress may be wise to take a fresh
look at the patent venue issue regardless of how the Supreme Court
decides the TC Heartland case.67

Id.
Indeed, Senator Orrin Hatch in February 2017 promised to take up the issue regardless
of how the Supreme Court rules. See Gene Quinn, Hatch Says Patent Venue Reform Likely
Regardless of SCOTUS Decision in TC Heartland, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 16, 2017), www.ip
watchdog.com/2017/02/16/hatch-venue-reform-likely-scotus-tc-heartland/id=78495/.
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In particular, under the Fourco rules patent owners seeking to file suit
simultaneously against multiple infringers may have great difficulty in
finding a single forum in which to file a nationwide infringement action
against all defendants. The Fourco rules ensure that there will be at least
one forum (and likely multiple forums) within which to sue a single
defendant. However, if there is no single forum in which venue is proper
for all defendants, the plaintiff might be required to file multiple suits.
Filing multiple suits is rarely an attractive option for a patent owner;
multiple patent lawsuits are not only expensive, but they also increase the
risk that at least one federal court will declare the patent invalid.
This issue may be particularly problematic for owners of
pharmaceutical patents. The Hatch-Waxman Act68 provides potential
generic-drug competitors with lucrative incentives to file applications with
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that essentially force the
patentee to file a patent infringement lawsuit against the applicants.69 If a
patented drug has substantial sales, it is highly likely that multiple generic
drug companies will file FDA applications, thereby requiring the patentee
to file infringement claims against each of them. If there is no single forum
in which all generic companies can be sued under the Fourco venue rules,
the patentee could be forced to defend its patent by filing multiple
infringement suits simultaneously.
If Congress were to determine that the patent venue statute needed to
be tweaked to prevent such difficulties from arising, it would have little
difficulty in drafting a legislative fix that would conform to due process
requirements. For example, such proposed legislation could decree that
venue is proper in the Districts of Maryland and the District of Columbia
(where FDA is located) for any infringement lawsuit prompted by FDA
filings. It could then amend 28 U.S.C. § 1694 to grant the two federal
district courts the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over patentinfringement defendants in those circumstances.70
On the other hand, what the Supreme Court should not do is to follow
the lead of the Federal Circuit; in other words, it should not allow
Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013).
70
Congress, when establishing venue and jurisdiction within the unified federal court
system, is not subject to the same due process constraints imposed on States by Daimler,
because the federal government does not operate under the same federalism-based
constraints faced by States when they seek to exercise authority within the borders of other
States. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that whether the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause imposes any limits on Congress’s power to expand personal jurisdiction
over American entities in the federal district courts is an open question. Omni Capital Int’l,
Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987); see Robert A. Lusardi,
Nationwide Service of Process: Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 48 (1988).
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perceived policy preferences to influence its interpretation of the patent
venue statute. That statute has been virtually unchanged for 125 years,
and it has twice been construed authoritatively by the Supreme Court. If
the needs of patent litigants suggest that changes in patent venue rules are
warranted, those changes ought to come from Congress, not the courts.

V. CONCLUSION
While the question presented in TC Heartland focuses solely on the
proper construction of the patent venue statute,71 the case also implicates
important personal jurisdiction issues. The Federal Circuit decision under
review not only interpreted the patent venue statute broadly, it also very
broadly construed the authority of federal district courts to exercise
nationwide personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations that
maintain few contacts with the forum. The Federal Circuit’s personal
jurisdiction ruling conflicts with recent Supreme Court precedent and
raises serious due process concerns. The Supreme Court can avoid the
need to address those concerns by reaffirming its prior, narrow
interpretation of the patent venue statute: a corporation should be deemed
to “reside” solely in the State where it is incorporated.

71

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).

